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To stimulate product reviews, many e-commerce platforms have launched reviewer incentive programs in 
which free product samples are provided to reviewers in exchange for their ratings of the samples. This 
study focuses on an unexplored aspect of reviewer incentive programs—the impact of participating in such 
programs on reviewers’ ratings of products they purchased normally (i.e., regular ratings). We find that 
after reviewers join the program and receive free product samples, their average regular rating increases by 
2.25% (i.e., 0.093 more stars on the five-star scale). Our follow-up analyses indicate that the observed 
regular-rating increase can be attributed to an uncertainty-reduction effect evoked by the free product 
samples, as opposed to a reciprocity effect. We further delve into the underlying mechanism by analyzing 
the reviewers’ regular ratings at a granular, product-category level. Consistent with our theorization of the 
uncertainty-reduction effect, our findings reveal that reviewers’ regular-rating increase is driven by 
improved assessment and knowledge about products sharing common attributes with the sampled products, 
resulting in better post-purchase outcomes. Our results demonstrate that apart from motivating the feedback 
for the sampled products, free product sampling can reduce reviewers’ product uncertainty and trigger 
evident change in their regular ratings for the purchased products. 
 




Online reviews have become an important information source. 66% of customers read product reviews 
before making purchasing decisions (Nielson 2014), and 90% of those who read reviews state that their 
purchasing decisions are influenced by the reviews (Dimensional Research 2013). Owing to this influence 
on consumers, e-commerce platforms have begun using reviewer incentive programs to stimulate product 
reviews through free product sampling. For example, Amazon.com (henceforth, Amazon) introduced a 
reviewer incentive program, Vine, to which experienced reviewers were invited. Participants can receive 
free product samples through the program, and they need to provide their opinions for the received samples; 
Walmart.com launched a similar program, known as Spark, to facilitate consumer feedback; Qunar.com 
and Ctrip.com, two of the biggest travel booking platforms in China, provided free hotel stays to consumers 
in exchange for their feedback; and Christianaudio.com developed a similar reviewer incentive program to 
generate reviews for their audiobooks. The model for incentive programs is similar across platforms. It is 
usually most trusted and experienced reviewers who are invited to such programs. Once they have joined 
the program, participants can choose and receive free product samples, for which they are required to 
provide feedback, since the purpose of such programs is to generate reviews for the sampled products. In 
other words, reviewer incentive programs are originally designed to accelerate the generation of consumer 
reviews for the sampled products.  
Extant studies find that receiving free products from independent sellers can trigger a reciprocity 
effect and motivate receivers to post higher ratings for the sampled products (Lin et al. 2019), and 
significantly reduce the likelihood of negative feedback (Cabral and Li 2015). Concerned that such seller-
initiated incentives can bias the review system, platforms start to restrict its use. For instance, starting from 
October 2016, Amazon stops all the seller-initiated reviewer incentive practice and prohibits independent 
sellers from sending out free samples in exchange for favorable reviews, and instead encourages reviewers 
to join its Vine program.1 Moreover, platforms emphasize that the purpose of their reviewer incentive 
 
1 See https://blog.aboutamazon.com/innovation/update-on-customer-reviews (accessed Feb 26th, 2020) 
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programs is to generate organic feedbacks to products, and the reviewers need to provide their honest 
opinions of the sampled products. For example, Amazon specifies that reviewers’ ratings are irrelevant to 
their eligibility to its Vine program.2 Thanks to these policies, the seller-initiated reviewer incentive practice 
has been gradually phased out, and the platform-initiated reviewer incentive programs become the dominant 
reviewer incentive programs on e-commerce platforms.  
However, despite the significant influence of platform-initiated reviewer incentive programs, scant 
attention has been paid to the fact that the reviewers continue to generate reviews for their purchased 
products after joining such programs. In this study, we refer to the ratings for the free product samples as 
the incentivized ratings and the ratings for the purchased products as the regular ratings. While existing 
studies have focused on the effect of seller-initiated incentives on the incentivized ratings (Cabral and Li 
2015, Lin et al. 2019), whether and how receiving free product samples from the platform-initiated 
programs can impact the reviewers’ regular ratings is not well understood despite its economic significance.  
The impact of the platform-initiated programs on regular ratings is not trivial, since the participants 
in such programs are often trusted and experienced reviewers, and their opinions are influential on 
consumers’ affinity and purchase decisions (Chen et al. 2008, Cone 2011, Nielson 2014). The regular 
ratings also outnumber the incentivized ratings in volume, and customers trust the regular ratings more 
(Kokkodis and Lappas 2016). It is thus critical for both practitioners and researchers to understand the 
effects of the reviewer incentive programs on participants’ regular ratings. Therefore, we pose our main 
research question—How do a reviewer’s regular ratings change after he or she starts to receive free 
product samples from a reviewer incentive program? 
The answer to this question is not straightforward, as reviewers’ regular ratings can increase or 
remain unchanged after they join the program and receive free product samples. Reviewers’ regular ratings 
result from their post-purchase outcomes (e.g., Ho et al. 2017) and their pursuit of benefits (e.g., Shen et al. 
2015). On the one hand, experiencing product samples provides reviewers with more concrete product 
 
2 https://www.amazon.com/gp/vine/help (accessed Feb 26th, 2020) 
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information (Mark and Kamins 1988) and reduces their uncertainty on related products that share similar 
attributes with the samples, leading to better purchase decisions and thus higher regular ratings. Besides, 
reviewers may perceive free samples as monetary gains and attempt to reciprocate the platform by posting 
higher regular ratings. On the other hand, however, reviewers’ regular ratings can remain unchanged. As 
reviewers’ purchased products are not usually identical to the sampled ones, it is unclear to what extent 
their purchase uncertainty can be alleviated by their experience of product samples. Besides, reviewers can 
repay the platform through different means (e.g., more purchases), and whether they will reciprocate the 
platform by intentionally increasing their regular ratings is an open question.  
An empirical challenge to answer the proposed question is the possible endogeneity issue arising 
from self-selection into such a reviewer incentive program. While a randomized controlled experiment 
where reviewers are randomly assigned to the treatment group (i.e., the reviewer incentive program) or the 
control group is ideal, it is not feasible in our context because the regular ratings result from reviewers’ 
experience with their purchased products, and it can be prohibitively challenging to mimic consumers’ real 
purchase behaviors in an experimental setting. Therefore, we rely on observational data from the Vine 
program, Amazon’s reviewer incentive program. For the identification purpose, we use a difference-in-
differences method combined with a propensity score matching technique. Specifically, we estimate a two-
way fixed effects model with both time and reviewer fixed effects to control for the unobserved time trend 
and the reviewer attributes.  
Our results indicate that after reviewers receive free product samples from the Vine program, their 
regular ratings increase by 2.25% (0.093 more stars on the five-star scale). Following the existing literature 
(e.g., Jung et al. 2019), we confirm the result with a rigorous falsification test, in which we show that the 
rating change can only be observed around the actual program participating time but not around the 
arbitrarily assigned time points. Moreover, we use a relative time model and confirm that in the pre-
participation period, there is no significant difference between the regular ratings posted by the reviewers 
who join the program and the ratings posted by the reviewers who do not.  
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We further delve into the underlying mechanism of the increased regular ratings after reviewers 
receive free product samples from the platform-initiated reviewer incentive programs. Our finding implies 
that receiving free product samples from the platform may bias the recipients’ evaluations for the purchased 
products and that platforms can use free product sampling to “buy” positive ratings. We explore two 
possible mechanisms driving the regular-rating increase, namely, the uncertainty-reduction effect and the 
reciprocity effect. Under the uncertainty-reduction effect, the free product samples help the reviewers better 
understand the products and reduce their uncertainty about products similar to the sampled product, leading 
to improved post-purchase outcomes such as higher regular ratings. Under the reciprocity effect, after 
receiving free products (benefit) from the platform (benefit provider), reviewers (benefit recipients) 
reciprocate with higher ratings on the platform (Gouldner 1960). 
Differentiating the two mechanisms may result in very different managerial decisions for e-
commerce platforms. If the former is the case, that receiving free samples biases reviewers’ evaluations is 
less of concern. That is, the regular-rating increase is mainly due to improved assessment and knowledge 
about products sharing common attributes with the sampled products, resulting in better post-purchase 
outcomes. However, if the observed regular-rating increase is due to a reciprocity effect, platforms need to 
be cautious in implementing the reviewer incentive program because free products can be considered 
financial gains by reviewers and potentially bias their evaluations of purchased products.  
To explore these two possibilities, we investigate reviewers’ regular rating changes at a fine-
grained, product-category level, and results consistently indicate that the uncertainty-reduction mechanism 
is at play in our context. Specifically, we find that (i) reviewers’ regular ratings increase only in the 
categories where the product samples are available, (ii) reviewers’ regular-rating increase is more 
pronounced in product categories where products are less differentiated (or more homogenous) such that 
they are more conducive to product assessment in the same category, and (iii) reviewers’ regular ratings in 
one category are positively associated with the number of product samples they receive from the same 
category, but not with the number of samples from other categories. We further confirm these results by 
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using products’ full category information and verifying our results at more granular, subcategory and sub-
subcategory levels.  
Our study demonstrates that a platform-initiated reviewer incentive program not only encourages 
incentivized reviews but also elevates the recipients’ regular ratings for the purchased products. Given the 
economic significance of regular ratings, platforms need to keep abreast of these economic consequences 
and design their reviewer incentive programs accordingly.  
In the next section, we review the related literature. In Section 3, we discuss theoretical 
backgrounds of this study. Section 4 describes our research context and dataset. Section 5 specifies our 
empirical models and results. We discuss the underlying mechanism in Section 6. Section 7 conducts a 
series of robustness checks. Section 8 discusses scholarly and practical implications and concludes. 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Regular Rating Generation 
There are two streams of literature investigating reviewers’ rating generation. The first stream studies the 
relationship between consumers’ post-purchase outcomes and their regular ratings. For instance, consumers 
are more likely to post ratings when they have extreme post-purchase utility, leading to a bimodal 
distribution of ratings (Hu et al. 2006). Moreover, Li and Hitt (2008) indicate that consumers who like the 
product are more likely to post reviews early in a product’s life cycle, and the product’s average rating tends 
to decrease over time. Li and Hitt (2010) demonstrate that reviewers determine their ratings based on the 
overall purchase utility, thus the post-purchase value of the product decreases as product prices rise. Ho et 
al. (2017) show the effect of disconfirmation, the difference between the expectation at the pre-purchase 
stage and realized assessment of the same product at the post-purchase stage, on consumers’ rating 
behaviors. Similarly, Lin and Heng (2015) indicate that extremely high ratings at the early stage of the 
product cycle are more likely to result in negative reviews subsequently because of the large 
disconfirmation in a later stage of the product cycle.  
The second stream investigates the relationship between social and economic factors and 
reviewers’ product ratings. Some studies focus on social benefits, such as the attention of their peers. For 
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example, Shen et al. (2015) demonstrate that the competition between reviewers for attention affects the 
reviewers’ ratings, as reviewers tend to post ratings different from the existing ones. Goes et al. (2014) 
show that consumers’ ratings are affected by the number of incoming social ties from other consumers. Lee 
et al. (2015) report the impact of prior ratings by strangers is different from that by friends on a subsequent 
individuals’ rating provision. Other studies examine the impact of financial incentives offered by platforms 
or sellers on reviewers’ regular ratings. Cabral and Li (2015) show that when the sellers offer a promotion, 
such as a cash rebate, the likelihood of negative feedback is significantly reduced due to reciprocity. 
Similarly, Lin et al. (2019) document that reviewers increase their rating of sampled product provided by a 
seller on Taobao.com as they reciprocate the seller with higher ratings.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the effects of the platform-initiated 
reviewer incentive program on participants’ regular ratings for their purchased products.  
2.2 Product Sampling 
Free product sampling is a common promotional tool. The free samples help consumers understand the 
product better and make more informed purchase decisions (Biswas et al. 2010). Free product sampling has 
been reported more effective than other marketing strategies (e.g., Smith and Swinyard 1983, Mark and 
Kamins 1988, Smith 1993) and result in improved economic outcomes in terms of product sales (Hahn et 
al. 1994), brand sales (Bawa and Shoemaker 2004), and firm profits (Cheng and Liu 2012). 
The premise of free product sampling is that sampling allows consumers to learn about a product 
and thus reduce their perceived uncertainty associated with its quality and value (Rothschild and Gaidis 
1981, Goering 1985, Jamieson and Bass 1989). For example, Mark and Kamins (1988) show that belief 
and attitudinal confidence for certain products are higher whey consumers experience and sample them. 
Mano and Oliver (1993) show that the purchase satisfaction is affected by the accuracy of product 
evaluation, which can be enhanced by product sampling. In general, product sampling helps consumers 
form a more accurate expectation (Goering 1985, Cheng and Liu 2012) and belief (Mark and Kamins 1988) 
of a product.  
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In this study, we focus on an emerging marketing practice, free product sampling, to stimulate user 
product ratings. Our study contributes to the burgeoning literature that investigates the relationship between 
free product sampling and consumers’ product ratings (e.g., Lin et al. 2019). However, unlike extant 
literature that investigated the impact of product sampling on the incentivized rating (Lin et al. 2019) or on 
the sampled products (Lee and Tan 2013, Mo and Li 2018), we aim to explore the impact of free product 
sampling on regular ratings.  
3. Theorization of the Impact on Regular Ratings 
In this section, we build theoretical foundations for the effect of free product sampling on reviewers’ regular 
ratings. To this end, we draw upon two streams of prior work which have documented that reviewers’ 
regular ratings are related to their post-purchase outcomes (e.g., Lin and Heng 2015, Ho et al. 2017) and 
their pursuit of benefits (e.g., Shen et al. 2015), respectively.  
First, receiving free product samples can result in higher regular ratings by helping consumers make 
more informed purchase decisions. Consumers have uncertainties about products they have not experienced, 
and such uncertainties become more pronounced in e-commerce contexts (Hong and Pavlou 2014). Before 
they make purchases, consumers conduct an investigation to better understand the product (Murray 1991), 
especially when monetary cost is involved (Gu et al. 2012). Studies have found that with product samples, 
consumers can not only learn more about products (Mark and Kamins 1988) but also form more accurate 
expectation of them (Goering 1985). Free product sampling enables reviewers to improve their assessment 
and knowledge about the sampled product as well as other products sharing similar features, leading to an 
uncertainty-reduction effect. Therefore, we posit that extended knowledge and experiences from product 
sampling can lead to better post-purchase outcomes in terms of higher regular ratings. Alternatively, it is 
also possible that receiving free product samples may not help consumers make better purchase decisions 
if there is little or no common attribute between their sampled and purchased products.  
Second, after joining the program, reviewers can change their regular ratings due to their pursuit of 
benefits. In this light, reviewers may post higher regular ratings to the platform because of reciprocity 
(Gouldner 1960). Recognizing a platform’s interest in seeking higher product ratings (e.g., Gu et al. 2012), 
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participants in the platform-initiated reviewer incentive program may reciprocate the platform in the form 
of higher regular ratings. Alternatively, it is also possible that reviewers do not necessarily increase their 
regular ratings but reciprocate the platform through other means, such as more purchases and greater effort 
on review generation.  
Drawing upon two aforementioned theoretical grounds, we hypothesize that participating in a 
platform-initiated reviewer incentive program increases, or at least does not decrease, regular ratings, which 
we empirically examine in the next section. 
4. Research Context and Data 
We collect data from Amazon to investigate these issues empirically. In August 2007, Amazon launched 
the Vine program, a reviewer incentive program providing participants with free product samples. Amazon 
invited reviewers to join the program based on how experienced they are (e.g., the overall helpfulness of 
their reviews, review experience in different product categories, and review volume). The participants in 
this program are thus experienced reviewers. After joining the program, reviewers choose and receive 
product samples without paying,3  and they are required to provide feedback for those samples. The 
reviewers can maintain their status in Vine as long as they provide feedback within 30 days after receiving 
a free product. Amazon specifies that reviewers’ ratings (i.e., our interested aspect) don’t affect their status 
in the program.4  
On the review page, the badge “Vine Customer Review of Free Product” indicates that the reviewer 
receives the product as a free sample from Amazon. In this study, we treat the reviews for the free Vine 
product samples as the incentivized reviews (or Vine reviews) and the rest as the regular reviews. Figure 1 
shows examples of these two types of reviews. 
 
3 Reviewers receive a newsletter every month listing the free products they can choose. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_Vine (accessed Feb 26th, 2020). 




Figure 1. Screenshot of Two Types of Review on Amazon 
To understand how reviewers’ regular ratings change after they join the Vine program and start to 
receive free product samples, we need to check all reviews posted by a group of sampled reviewers to 
identify who have generated Vine reviews and when. We therefore collect all reviews posted by the top 
experienced reviewers and the corresponding product information for each review. 5 We choose the top 
experienced reviewers as our sampled reviewers because the platforms generally invite experienced 
reviewers into the program. Moreover, to examine the impact of the Vine program on the participants’ 
regular ratings and correct the sample selection issue, we conduct sample matching before our empirical 
estimation. Focusing on reviewers who are all top experienced helps us make a fair comparison.  
In this study, we examine reviewers’ ratings between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2009 for 
several reasons. First, Amazon initiated the Vine program in August 2007, so targeting this period helps us 
better understand reviewers’ rating differences before and after the existence of the program. Second, 
during our study period, the policies of the Vine program remained constant. Once participating in the 
program, reviewers can stay in the program as long as they provide feedback on time after receiving free 
product samples. In other words, whether they are eligible to be in the program is not contingent on their 
regular ratings. Finally, this sample period is before reviewers start to receive free products from 
independent sellers on Amazon; thus, our estimations are not affected by those activities.6, 7  
 
5 We collect the top experienced reviewers from Amazon's Top Customer Reviewers page, which lists the top 
10,000 reviewers based on their experience, such as total reviews posted and the total helpfulness votes received. 
6 This practice started in 2010 and was fully banned by Amazon in 2016. See https://reviewmeta.com/blog/analysis-
of-7-million-amazon-reviews-customers-who-receive-free-or-discounted-item-much-more-likely-to-write-positive-
review/ (accessed Feb 26th, 2020). 
7 We also analyze the reviewers’ regular ratings in different sampled time periods, such as January 2007 to 
December 2013, and the results are qualitatively consistent.  
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We focus on the active reviewers who have written at least one review before the study period and 
continue to post reviews throughout this period. Consequently, our sample includes 3,487 reviewers, of 
whom 1,673 reviewers participated in the Vine program. Also, our review dataset encompasses 336,899 
reviews, including 46,162 incentivized reviews and 290,737 regular reviews. For each review, our dataset 
also includes the reviewer ID, product ID, product category, product name, product price, review timestamp, 
review text, rating, and review helpfulness vote.  
5. Econometric Model and the Impact on Regular Ratings 
We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to test how participating in a platform-initiated 
reviewer incentive program affects reviewers’ regular ratings. The basic idea is to compare a group of 
treated reviewers in the pre- and post-treatment periods (i.e., before and after joining the program and 
receiving product samples), with a group of untreated reviewers to control for the unobserved time-variant 
factors. Figure 2 illustrates our DID design. The treatment group includes the reviewers who generate at 
least one incentivized review and the control group includes other reviewers. The treated reviewers generate 
regular reviews before joining the program, and they provide both regular and incentivized reviews after 
starting to receive the product samples. Reviewers in the control group only generate regular reviews during 
the entire period. It is worth noting that in this study, we only focus on reviewers’ regular ratings. Although 
the treated reviewers generate both types of reviews after joining the program, we do not consider their 
incentivized ratings when we construct the dependent variable.  
 
Figure 2. Review Activities of Reviewers in Different Groups 
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We employ a propensity score matching to correct for a potential sample selection bias due to the 
observable differences between treated reviewers and untreated reviewers. Specifically, we generate a 
sample of untreated reviewers who are similar to the treated reviewers. In other words, each treated reviewer 
is paired with an untreated reviewer who is similar in terms of the probability of participating in the Vine 
program (the detailed matching procedures are in Appendix A). From our calculation of the propensity 
score and Amazon’s official announcement, we learn that reviewers’ propensity for joining the program is 
associated with factors such as the overall helpfulness of the reviews, reviewers’ experience in different 
product categories, and review volume. We use one-to-one matching with replacement, under a caliper size 
0.2 times the standard deviation of the propensity score (Xu et al. 2016). After matching, we compare the 
treated reviewers with the reviewers in the control group, and we find the reviewers are not statistically 
different in two groups (Appendix A, Table A.2). We further compare the distributions of the propensity 
scores of the matched and unmatched samples and check the covariate balance before and after matching 
using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. The results of the covariate balance check and the distribution test 
jointly reveal that we have a strong match between the two groups of reviewers. Figure 3 shows that the 
propensity score distributions of the treated and untreated reviewers are similar after matching. 
  
Figure 3. Distributions of Propensity Scores for Treatment Group and Control Group 
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After constructing the reviewer sample, we build a panel dataset at the reviewer-month (it) level, 
where i and t indicate a reviewer and a month, respectively. In our setting, reviewers’ program participation 
is a staggered adoption (Athey and Imbens 2018). Specifically, (i) the observations are in multiple periods, 
(ii) reviewers’ program participation time varies, and (iii) reviewers remain in the program after 
participating. With this setting, following the existing literature (e.g., Xu et al. 2016, Callaway and 
Sant’Anna 2019), we utilize a two-way fixed effects regression model to estimate the average treatment 
effects. Each observation describes reviewer i’s average regular rating at month t. Combining the matching 
strategy with a DID approach, our empirical model is as follows: 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝛽 𝛽 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝛽 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝛽 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑋 𝜏 𝛿 𝜖   
(1) 
where AvgRegRatingit is the dependent variable, representing reviewer i’s average regular rating at month 
t. 𝜏  is the time fixed effects to control for unobserved time trend and 𝛿  is the reviewer-level fixed effects 
to control for the unobserved reviewer-level characteristics. VineRevieweri is a binary variable that equals 
1 if reviewer i is an incentivized reviewer, and 0 otherwise. VineMonthit is a binary variable indicating the 
post-participation period for the treated reviewer i and his/her matched counterpart. For instance, if a 
reviewer joins the Vine program in December 2007, VineMonthit equals 1 for that month and the months 
after and equals 0 before that month. The matched reviewer for this treated reviewer will have the same 
value for VineMonthit throughout the sample period. The coefficient of the interaction term 𝛽  is the DID 
estimator that captures how the reviewers’ regular ratings change after they join the Vine program—our 
main interest. Table 1 summarizes the description and statistics of the main variables in our matched dataset. 
In addition to our main covariates, we also control for a series of observed covariates, Xit. We first 
include reviewers’ past review behaviors in each product category. The ratio of the reviews on a specific 
product category to the total generated reviews represents the reviewer’s review experience in that category. 
Specifically, we include BookPastRatioit-1, MoviesPastRatioit-1, CDsPastRatioit-1, ElectronicPastRatioit-1, 
HomePastRatioi-1t, GroceryPastRatioit-1, and HealthPastRatioit-1 to represent the ratio of total reviews from 
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the categories “Books,” “Movies & TV,” “CDs & Vinyl,” “Electronics,” “Home & Kitchen,” “Grocery & 
Gourmet Food,” and “Health & Personal Care,” respectively, to the total number of reviews reviewer i 
generated by the end of month t-1. We choose those seven product categories because they are the most 
popular ones, and we use the ratio for the rest of the product categories as our baseline.  
Table 1. Description of Variables 
Variable  Description Mean Std. Dev. N 
VineRevieweri A binary variable indicating whether reviewer 
i participated in the Vine program between our 
study period: 
1 = Reviewer i participated 
0 = Reviewer i did not participate 
0.424 0.494 120,240 
VineMonthit A binary variable indicating whether reviewer 
i participated in the Vine program at month t: 
1 = Reviewer i participated at month t  
0 = Reviewer i did not participate at month t 
0.500 0.500 120,240 
AvgRegRatingit The average rating of regular reviews reviewer 
i generated at month t 4.142 0.920 54,668 
Note: The number of observations for AvgRegRating is less than the number of observations for the other 
variables. Because our observation is on the reviewer-month level, AvgRegRating is missing values for the 
months that reviewers did not generate any regular reviews. AvgRegRating is on a scale of 1 to 5.  
 
We further account for the possibility that reviewers’ ratings may vary by the reviewed product 
category. To this end, we include BookRatioit, MoviesRatioit, CDsRatioit, ElectronicRatioit, HomeRatioit, 
GroceryRatioit, and HealthRatioit, representing the ratio of regular reviews from the categories of “Books,” 
“Movies & TV,” “CDs & Vinyl,” “Electronics,” “Home & Kitchen,” “Grocery & Gourmet Food,” and 
“Health & Personal Care,” respectively, to the total number of regular reviews generated by reviewer i at 
month t. Moreover, we use the log-transformed number of months reviewer i has been on Amazon by month 
t to represent reviewer i’s experience on Amazon. We cluster the error terms at the reviewer level to account 
for autocorrelation over time (Sun and Zhu 2013, Xu et al. 2016). Last, 𝛽  is an intercept and 𝜖  is a mean-
zero random error term.  
We present the estimation for the impact on reviewers’ regular ratings in Table 2. 𝛽  is positive 
and statistically significant (p-value<0.001). After reviewers join the reviewer incentive program and start 
to receive free product samples, their regular ratings increase by 0.093 stars on average, equivalent to an 
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increase of 2.25% (0.093/4.142*100%). Such an increase in ratings is also managerially significant, 
especially when consumers are more likely to trust regular reviews and feedback from experienced 
reviewers (Chen et al. 2008). Furthermore, review systems normally use discrete rating systems (one star, 
two stars, etc.), so a small increase in reviewers’ ratings can translate into a one-star difference in the actual 
rating displayed to consumers (Goes et al. 2014).  
             Table 2. Impact of Participating in Vine Program on Regular Ratings 
 (1) 
VineReviewer 𝛽  - 
VineMonth 𝛽  -0.017 
(0.017) 
VineReviewer× 
VineMonth 𝛽  
0.093*** 
(0.018) 
Control Variables YES 
Time Fixed YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES 
R-squared 0.315 
Observations 54,668 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The results are qualitatively 
consistent if we don’t include the reviewer or time fixed effects.  
 
6. Mechanism Explorations 
In this section, we explore several possible explanations to delve into the key underlying mechanism at play. 
Results demonstrate that (i) the increased regular ratings from the platform-initiated reviewer incentive 
program are not caused by reviewers’ selection of the highly rated products, (ii) the number of product 
samples is the key driver of the observed effect, and (iii) the free product samples affect participants’ regular 
ratings through an uncertainty-reduction effect, instead of a reciprocity effect.    
6.1 Driver Identification of Regular-Rating Changes 
One possible concern is that the observed regular-rating increase is simply due to other changes in reviewers’ 
review generation. For instance, it is possible that after starting to produce the incentivized reviews, 
reviewers decrease their regular-review volume and focus only on the high-rated products. To rule out this 
alternative explanation, we construct two dependent variables and test them with Equation (1); one is the 
reviewer i’s regular review volume at month t, and the other is the average rating difference between 
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reviewer i’s regular rating to a product and the product’s average rating. The analysis of the first dependent 
variable discerns whether reviewers are actively engaged in regular-review generation, and the analysis of 
the second variable indicates whether the observed regular-rating increase is simply caused by reviewers’ 
selection of the high-rated products.  
Table 3 presents the results. When the dependent variable is the regular review volume (Model 1), 
𝛽  is positive and significant, indicating that after joining the program, reviewers tend to produce more 
regular reviews. This finding further supports the conclusion that the magnitude of the regular-rating 
increase is meaningful. Moreover, when the dependent variable is the average rating difference between 
reviewer i’s regular rating of a product and the product’s average rating (Model 2), the estimation of 𝛽  is 
qualitatively consistent with that in Table 2. The result shows that after reviewers join a reviewer incentive 
program, they tend to provide higher regular rating relative to the product’s average rating. This indicates 
reviewers’ regular-rating increase is not simply due to reviewers’ selection of the high-rated products.  
Table 3. The Managerial Importance of the Regular-Rating Increase 
Dependent Variable 
Review Volume Rating Difference 
(1) (2) 
VineReviewer 𝛽  - - 










Control Variables YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES 
R-squared 0.567 0.283 
Observations 120,240 50,425 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
Our analysis shows that after reviewers join the program and start to receive product samples, their 
regular ratings increase. The observed rating change could potentially be caused by a participation effect 
or by receiving product samples (i.e., Vine products). The participation effect happens if reviewers are 
affected by simply joining the program, and their regular ratings increase as soon as they join the program. 
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However, if the reviewers’ rating increase is related to the product samples, their rating increase should 
vary by their engagement with the product sampling. To formally check whether the participation effect 
alone plays a role, we first conduct subsample analyses to examine the effects of the Vine program on the 
reviewers who receive a small number of sampled products and on the reviewers who receive a large 
number of sampled products. In operationalizing this, we first choose reviewers who receive the lowest 
quartile of aggregated sampled products: 418 incentivized reviewers are in this quartile, and on average 
these reviewers receive only 0.54 Vine products per month. We then consider reviewers who receive the 
highest quartile of aggregated sampled products: 426 incentivized reviewers are in this quartile, and they 
receive 3.32 free products per month on average. If reviewers’ rating increase is solely due to the 
participation effect, the average regular rating should increase for the reviewers from both groups. In 
contrast, if the received product samples are the key driver for reviewers’ rating increase, we should observe 
the rating increase only for the reviewers in the highest quartile.  
Table 4 presents the results of the subsample analyses. After reviewers join the Vine program, their 
regular ratings do not significantly change if they receive a small number of free products (Model 1). 
However, for the reviewers who do receive a large number of free products, regular ratings significantly 
increase after they start to receive the Vine products (Model 2). The results suggest that the participation 
effect is not, by itself, enough to motivate reviewers to provide higher regular ratings. In other words, the 
reviewers’ rating increase is closely related to the received product samples.  
We then alter Equation (1) to analyze the effect of product samples on reviewers’ regular ratings. 
Specifically, we substitute the DID term VineRevieweri × VineMonthit with VineProductsit-1, which is the 
log-transformed number of Vine products reviewer i receives up to the end of month t-1. The DID term in 
Equation (1) captures the average treatment effect on regular ratings, and the examination of VineProductsit-
1 reveals the relationship between reviewers’ regular ratings and the total number of Vine products they 
receive. The results (Table 4, Model 3) indicate that reviewers’ average regular rating is positively 




Table 4. Impact of Volume of Vine Products 
Specifications 
Lowest Quartile  Highest Quartile Vine Volume 
(1) (2) (3) 















VineProducts - - 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Control Variables YES YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.311 0.316 0.315 
Observations 12,842 13,733 54,668 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
6.2 Theorization of Two Possible Mechanisms 
Our analyses thus far paint the following picture. After participating in the Vine program, reviewers increase 
their regular ratings (Table 2). The regular-rating increase is managerially significant, and it cannot be 
explained by reviewers’ selection of highly rated products (Table 3). Moreover, receiving a sufficient 
number of free samples is essential for the rating increase, and the reviewers’ regular ratings are positively 
associated with the number of samples they receive (Table 4). The analyses demonstrate the impact of the 
Vine program on reviewers’ regular ratings and the key driver—free product samples. Here, we explore 
two possible underlying mechanisms by which platform-initiated reviewer incentive programs elevate 
regular product ratings, namely, the uncertainty-reduction effect and the reciprocity effect.   
First, receiving free product samples can result in higher regular ratings through an uncertainty-
reduction effect. Consumers’ understanding of a product category can help them make better purchase 
decisions in that category (Johnson and Russo 1984). Product samples help consumers learn more about 
product features (Mark and Kamins 1988) and increase their assessment and knowledge about other 
products sharing common attributes (e.g., products within the same category) (Biswas et al. 2010), leading 
to enhanced post-purchase outcomes. By the same token, the uncertainty-reduction theory does not predict 
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or explain increased regular ratings of products that don’t share common attributes with the sampled 
products (e.g., products in other categories). Moreover, reviewers’ regular ratings are negatively associated 
with disconfirmation between the pre-purchase expectation and post-purchase experience (Lin and Heng 
2015, Ho et al. 2017). Such expectation disconfirmation can be mitigated if consumers understand the 
product better and form more accurate expectations at the pre-purchase stage. Therefore, we posit that 
increased knowledge from product samples can lead to better post-purchase outcomes in terms of higher 
regular ratings. 
Second, receiving free products may stimulate a reciprocity effect as reviewers may perceive the 
free products as financial benefits and reciprocate the platform with higher ratings. This is because 
individuals receiving benefits from others may feel obligated to behave in a more friendly way to the 
provider of the benefits (Gouldner 1960). Moreover, benefit receivers determine their reciprocal behaviors 
based on their understanding of the purpose of benefits providers (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). In the 
platform-initiated reviewer incentive program, the provider of the free samples is the platform; and the 
platform’s ultimate goal is to sell products and product sales are positively associated with product ratings 
(Duan et al. 2008, Forman et al. 2008, Gu et al. 2012). In this light, reviewers may choose to repay the 
platform with higher ratings because they believe doing so can discharge their obligation to the platform. 
Additionally, the platform-initiated reviewer incentive program publicly announces that the participants 
should rate the product samples in an unbiased manner. The theory of reciprocity states that receiving 
benefits can place the recipients in an uncomfortable state of tension (“indebtedness” in Greenberg 1980). 
As a result, reciprocity occurs when the recipient wants to repay the received benefits to reduce this 
discomfort. When an opportunity to reciprocate is limited, people tend to find alternative ways to reduce 
this discomfort (Shumaker and Brownell 1984, p. 14). Therefore, when repaying the platform with higher 
incentivized ratings is restricted, it is plausible reviewers repay the platform with higher regular ratings as 
an alternative. Unlike the uncertainty-reduction effect, the reciprocity effect does predict or explain 
increased regular ratings of products across all product categories, regardless of whether they belong to the 
category of sampled products, which is useful in our empirical validation in the next section.  
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6.3 Empirical Tests for Two Possible Mechanisms 
To empirically check whether the uncertainty-reduction effect or the reciprocity effect is at play, we 
construct a panel dataset at the reviewer-category-month level (ikt) where i, k, and t represent a reviewer, a 
product category, and a month, respectively. Each observation describes reviewer i’s behaviors for product 
category k at month t. This model is also based on the matched reviewer samples, and further allows us to 
better describe the received Vine products. Instead of using the portion of the products from each category 
as controls in Equation (1), we now introduce the product category fixed effects to control for the category 
heterogeneity. Specifically, we use the following model:  
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝛽 𝛽 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝛽 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝛽 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑋 𝜏 𝛿 𝜌 𝜖   
(2) 
where the dependent variable AvgRegRatingikt represents reviewer i’s average regular rating for product 
category k at month t, and 𝜌  is the product-category fixed effects. We estimate this model and confirm that 
the result (Table 5, Model 1) is consistent with that in Table 2. 
Furthermore, with the panel dataset at the reviewer-category-month level, we distinguish the 
uncertainty-reduction effect and the reciprocity effect by differentiating the product categories based on 
several standards. The following analyses consistently demonstrate that reviewers’ regular-rating increase 
can be explained by the uncertainty-reduction effect of product sampling.  
6.3.1 Vine and Non-Vine Categories 
We differentiate the product categories based on the availability of Vine products. Specifically, Vine 
products are not always available in all product categories. We conduct separate subsample analyses for 
reviewers’ regular ratings in the product categories where Vine products are available (i.e., Vine categories) 
and in the product categories where Vine products are not (i.e., Non-Vine categories). If an uncertainty-
reduction effect manifests and reviewers learn from the sampled products, we expect the available product 
samples to be related to the purchased products. That is, if reviewers’ regular ratings increase owing to 
enhanced product information from Vine product sampling, their regular ratings are likely to increase only 
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in the Vine categories, not in the Non-Vine categories. In contrast, if reviewers intentionally increase their 
regular ratings to repay the platform, their regular ratings should increase in both the Vine and Non-Vine 
categories indiscriminately. The results show that reviewers’ regular ratings increase only in the Vine 
categories (Table 5, Model 2), not in the Non-Vine categories (Table 5, Model 3), suggesting that the 
availability of the related product samples plays an important role in reviewers’ regular-rating increase for 
the purchased products.  
Table 5. Impact of the Vine Program in Vine and Non-Vine Product Categories 
Specifications 
Overall Vine Categories Non-Vine Categories 
(1) (2) (3) 
VineReviewer 𝛽  - - - 














Control Variables YES YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.212 0.224 0.789 
Observations 85,496 84,736 760 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month-category level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
6.3.2 Low- and High-Heterogeneity Categories 
We differentiate the product categories based on the level of product heterogeneity within a category. 
Specifically, we differentiate the product categories based on whether the products within the category are 
closely related to each other. The awarded Vine products and purchased products are not identical, and if 
reviewers can understand more about the purchased products by using the sampled ones, the Vine products 
that reviewers receive can better inform reviewers on related products they purchase. In this light, for the 
categories where products are highly differentiated from each other, we conjecture that the uncertainty-
reduction effect will be minimal because reviewers are less able to infer helpful information from the 
sampled products due to heterogeneity in products within the same category. Accordingly, we divide Vine 
categories into high-heterogeneity and low-heterogeneity product categories. Specifically, we treat the 
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product categories that are about entertainment and media as high-heterogeneity product categories, since 
creating highly heterogeneous content is normally the goal of this industry (e.g., Hanson and Xiang 2011, 
Hennig-Thurau and Houston 2019, p. 205). For instance, we treat the “Book” and “Kindle Store” as the 
high-heterogeneity product categories. Reading one sampled book does not necessarily help consumers 
understand more about the qualities of other books to be purchased due to their inherent differences in genre, 
style, appeal, and other characteristics. We treat the rest categories as low-heterogeneity product categories. 
Table 6 provides the detailed category classifications. 
We conduct subsample analyses and estimate reviewers’ regular-rating changes in the high- and 
low-heterogeneity categories, respectively. Results in Table 7 show that both the magnitude and the 
significance level of reviewers’ regular-rating increases in the low-heterogeneity categories are higher than 
those in the high-heterogeneity ones. Specifically, after joining the program, reviewers’ average regular 
rating increases by 0.091 stars in the high-heterogeneity categories (𝛽  in Model 1, p-value=0.091), 
compared to 0.161 stars in the low-heterogeneity categories (𝛽  in Model 2, p-value<0.001). The results 
demonstrate that the positive effect of Vine products on reviewers’ regular ratings is more pronounced for 
the categories where the products are not less differentiated, confirming that the uncertainty-reduction effect 
of the free samples plays a key role.  
Table 6. Classifications of Product Categories 




Books; Video Games; Movies & TV; CDs & Vinyl; Kindle Store 
Low-Heterogeneity Categories 
Arts, Crafts & Sewing; Automotive; Baby Products; Beauty; Cell Phones & Accessories; 
Clothing, Shoes & Jewelry; Electronics; Grocery & Gourmet Food; Software; Health & 
Personal Care; Home & Kitchen; Industrial & Scientific; Office Products; Patio, Lawn & 
Garden; Pet Supplies; Power & Hand Tools; Sports & Outdoors; Tools & Home 
Improvement; Toys & Games 
Non-Vine Categories 
Appliances; Collectibles & Fine Art; Grills & Outdoor Cooking; Kitchen & Dining; Lawn 
Mowers & Outdoor Power Tools; Lights & Lighting Accessories; Magazine 
Subscriptions; Medical Supplies & Equipment; Mobility & Daily Living Aids; Musical 
Instruments; Outdoor Cooking Tools & Accessories; Power Tool Parts & Accessories; 












VineReviewer 𝛽  - - 










Control Variables YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES 
R-squared 0.270 0.152 
Observations 53,027 31,709 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month-category level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
6.3.3 Within- and Cross-Category Vine Products 
We divide the product samples based on the product category. Specifically, we investigate how reviewers’ 
regular ratings in a product category are associated with the number of Vine products from the same 
category (i.e., focal category) and the number of Vine products from the other categories. If the reviewers’ 
regular-rating increase is related to an uncertainty-reduction effect, their regular ratings in a category should 
be positively associated only with the number of Vine products from the same category, but not with the 
number of Vine products from the other categories. This is because experiencing product samples can help 
reviewers better understand closely related products, the products that share common attributes with the 
samples (e.g., from the same category). In contrast, if the reviewers’ regular-rating increase is stimulated 
by a reciprocity effect, we can expect that the number of Vine products they receive, no matter which 
categories they come from, is positively associated with their regular ratings. In other words, receiving Vine 
products would increase the regular ratings regardless of the similitude between the Vine products and their 
purchased ones, if the product samples are treated as benefits.  
After receiving product samples, if the reviewers’ regular ratings increase due to an uncertainty-
reduction effect, their regular ratings for one product category should be positively associated with the 
number of product samples from that same category, but not samples from other categories. Moreover, we 
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expect this pattern to be significant in the low-heterogeneity product categories but not in the high-
heterogeneity product categories. On the contrary, if the free samples increase the reviewers’ regular ratings 
through a reciprocity effect, their regular ratings in one product category would be positively associated 
with the number of product samples from both the focal and other categories. Similarly, this positive 
association would then be found in all categories (i.e., both high- and low-heterogeneity product categories). 
To test our conjecture, we alter Equation (2) and substitute VineRevieweri × VineMonthit with 
VineProductsFocalikt-1 and VineProductsOtherikt-1, which are the log-transformed number of Vine products 
reviewer i respectively receives from category k and other categories up to the end of month t-1. Table 8 
presents the results. For the high-heterogeneity categories, reviewers’ regular ratings are not associated with 
the number of products they receive (Model 1). In contrast, for the low-heterogeneity categories, reviewers’ 
regular ratings in one category are positively associated only with the number of Vine products from the 
focal category, but not with the number of Vine products from other categories (Model 2). These results 
suggest that reviewers’ regular-rating increase primarily stems from an uncertainty-reduction effect caused 
by the received Vine products, rather than a reciprocity effect.  























Control Variables YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES 
R-squared 0.310 0.221 
Observations 53,027 31,709 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-




We also construct the panel dataset at a higher level of granularity. Amazon classifies the products 
into a category tree. There are several subcategories within each category and several sub-subcategories 
within each subcategory. Each product’s full category information is “Category › Subcategory › Sub-
subcategory,” as illustrated by a tree-shaped graph in Figure 4. We construct the panel dataset at the 
reviewer-subcategory-month level, where the dependent variable is reviewer i’s average regular rating for 
a subcategory on month t. We divide VineProductsFocal from the previous analyses into 
VineProductsSubFocal and VineProductsSubOther, which are the log-transformed numbers of Vine 
products reviewer i gets from the focal subcategory and other subcategories, respectively, up to the end of 
month t-1. The results (Table 9, Model 1) indicate that reviewers’ regular ratings in one subcategory are 
positively associated with the number of Vine products they receive from the focal subcategory but not with 
the number of Vine products from other subcategories or other categories.  
We further construct the panel dataset at the reviewer- ‘sub-subcategory’- month level, where the 
dependent variable is reviewer i’s average regular rating for a sub-subcategory on month t. We divide the 
VineProductsSubFocal into VineProductsSubSubFocal and VineProductsSubSubOther, which are the log-
transformed number of Vine products reviewer i gets from the focal sub-subcategory and other sub-
subcategories, respectively, up to the end of month t-1. The results show that reviewers’ regular ratings in 
one sub-subcategory are positively associated with the number of Vine products they receive from the focal 
sub-subcategory but not with the number of Vine products from other sub-subcategories, other 
subcategories, or other categories (Table 9, Model 2).  
 
Figure 4. Category Tree in Amazon 
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Table 9. Impact of Volume of Same- and Cross-Category Vine Products (Higher Granularity) 
Specifications 
Subcategory Level Sub-Subcategory Level 
(1) (2) 


























Control Variables YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES 
R-squared 0.205 0.197 
Observations 37,156 41,021 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month-subcategory level in column (1) and the user-month-sub-subcategory level in column (2). *Significant at 
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
7. Robustness Checks 
We perform a series of robustness checks, including: (i) classic DID and falsification tests, (ii) alternative 
matching approaches, and (iii) a relative time model. We find that our main results remain consistent across 
these robustness checks.  
7.1 Classic DID and Falsification Tests 
In our context, reviewers in the treatment group join the platform-initiated reviewer incentive program in 
different time periods, and after joining the program, reviewers remain in the program during our study 
period. For this staggered adoption, we have utilized a two-way fixed effects DID model coupled with 
propensity score matching in our main analyses (e.g., Xu et al. 2016, Callaway and Sant’Anna 2019). 
Existing studies also use a classic DID approach to estimate the treatment effect (e.g., Jung et al. 2019, 
Kumar et al. 2019). In a classic DID, researchers use a fixed number of observations (e.g., m) for each user 
before and after the treatment and construct the panel dataset. To check the robustness of our results, we 
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conduct a classic DID with the same propensity score matching specification used in our model. That is, 
supposing one treated reviewer joins the program in month t0, we would include the observations from t0-m 
to t0+m of the matched pair in the panel dataset and estimate Equation (1).  
Following Jung et al. (2019), we also adopt a falsification test to re-estimate the same DID model 
with all the same reviewer samples, model parameters, estimation model, propensity score matching 
equation, and caliper size except that we now shift VineMonthit, the binary variable indicating the program 
participation time, m months earlier. That is, the VineMonthit variable (described in our DID model) will 
equal 1 in t0-m ~ t0, a time period before reviewer i’s actual program participation time, not after. Naturally, 
due to the time shift, VineMonthit will equal 0 during t0-2m ~ t0-m and the total time periods for the falsification 
test will be from t0-2m to t0. In this falsification test, the shifted VineMonthit arbitrarily points to the periods 
before the actual program joining time, not after. The reviewers have not actually joined the Vine program 
yet. Therefore, the same model that we use to show the statistically significant impact should produce a 
non-significant estimation for the DID term because no treatment effect has actually occurred during the 
pre-treatment period. Figure 5 illustrates the sampled time periods for the classic DID and falsification tests. 
We check the classic DID and falsification test with m = 2, 3 and 4, and the results are qualitatively 
consistent with one another. Table 10 reports the results. For the classic DID test without the VineMonthit 
indicator being shifted, the estimation of the DID term is positive and significant (Models 1, 3, and 5). 
Consistent with the result in Table 2, classic DID estimation detects the significant regular-rating increase 
after reviewers join the Vine program. However, for the falsification test in which VineMonthit is shifted m 
months before the actual program joining time, the DID estimator turns out to be insignificant (Models 2, 
4, and 6), confirming our expectation.  
 
Figure 5. Time Periods for Classic DID and Falsification Test 
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Table 10. Classic DID and Falsification Test 
 
Panel A (m = 2) Panel B (m = 3) Panel C (m = 4) 
DID Falsification DID Falsification DID Falsification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VineReviewer 𝛽  - - - - - - 


























Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.628 0.657 0.550 0.560 0.490 0.507 
Observations 6,611 5,945 9,797 8,915 12,963 11,566 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
7.2 Alternative Matching Approaches 
We also employ different matching algorithms to show our results are robust. We use one-to-one matching 
without replacement and the nearest three neighbors matching algorithms to further validate the results.  
Moreover, to correct for potential selection biases arising from the unobservable differences between our 
treatment and control groups, we employ a look-ahead matching technique (Manchanda et al. 2015, Xu et 
al. 2016, Jung et al. 2019). To this end, we restrict the reviewers in the control group as non-participating 
reviewers at the time of matching who are going to participate in the Vine program at a future period. Since 
both sets of users do eventually join the program, this methodology accounts not just for the observed 
characteristics, but also for unobserved time-invariant attributes that affect whether reviewers receive 
treatment. To implement this matching approach, we choose the reviewers who joined the reviewer 
incentive program after December 2009 to be matching candidates in the control group, and we match them 
to the treated reviewers who joined the program before December 2009. Table 11 reports the results with 
different matching specifications. The results are consistent with the results in Table 2, providing more 









Nearest Three Neighbors 
(With Replacement) 
Look-Ahead Matching 
 (With Replacement) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VineReviewer 𝛽  - - - 














Control Variables YES YES YES 
Time Fixed YES YES YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.300 0.341 0.277 
Observations 37,030 98,896 48,505 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at the user-
month level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
7.3 A Relative Time Model 
It is possible that the treated reviewers gradually increase their regular ratings for unknown reasons during 
the pre-treatment period, but untreated reviewers do not. In this case, the treatment effect identified in our 
DID estimation will be due to the differences in their pre-existing trends in regular ratings, prior to 
participation in the Vine program, rather than to reviewers’ engagement in reviewer incentive program. Our 
falsification test helps us rule out the difference in pre-existing trends between the reviewers in two groups 
at some level. Here, we adopt a relative time model to further show that the regular ratings of the 
participating reviewers are not different from those of other reviewers at the pre-treatment periods.    
Following Jung et al. (2019), we check the existence of an unusual pre-existing trend with a two-
way fixed effects model, including a group of dummy variables for the relative time periods before and 
after the treatment: 
                     𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝛼 ∑ 𝛼 𝑠 φ  𝑋 𝜏 𝛿 𝜖   (3) 
where AvgRegRatingit is the dependent variable, representing reviewer i’s average regular rating at month 
t. 𝜏  is time fixed effects, and 𝛿  is reviewer fixed effects. 𝑠  is a binary variable indicating whether reviewer 
i participates in the program in our study period and φ is the relative time dummies representing the 
chronological distance between an observation period and reviewer i’s participation time. We set the 
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relative time periods to range from minus five to three, representing the periods five months before and 
three months after program participation. Additionally, to avoid a dummy variable trap, following 
Greenwood and Wattal (2017) and Jung et al. (2019), we choose one month before the reviewer’s 
participating month as the baseline and omit the dummy variable for that month. 
Table 12 presents the results of the relative time analysis. None of the estimation with the relative 
time dummies during the pre-treatment periods is significant (i.e., for t – 5, t – 4, t – 3, and t - 2), indicating 
pre-treatment homogeneity between the participating reviewers and their counterparts in the control group. 
Moreover, treated reviewers post higher regular ratings than the untreated reviewers in the post-treatment 
periods, a result consistent with the estimations of our main analyses.  
Table 12. A Relative Time Model 
 (1) 
t - 5 
-0.053 
(0.041) 
t - 4 
-0.010 
(0.041) 
t - 3 
-0.028 
 (0.037) 
t - 2  
-0.035 
(0.039) 
t - 1 Omitted 
t + 0 
0.096*** 
(0.034) 
t + 1 
0.089*** 
(0.034) 
t + 2 
0.059* 
 (0.035) 
t + 3 
0.075** 
(0.036) 
Control Variables YES 
Time Fixed YES 
Reviewer Fixed YES 
R-squared 0.437 
Observations 16,029 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by each reviewer are in parentheses. The unit of analyses is at user-month 




8. Implications and Conclusions 
Many e-commerce platforms have launched reviewer incentive programs that provide free product samples 
to reviewers in exchange for their reviews on the sampled products. The practice provides platforms with 
an unprecedented opportunity to facilitate product feedback. While the extant literature focuses on the 
effects of seller-initiated incentives on the incentivized ratings (Cabral and Li 2015, Lin et al. 2019), to the 
best of our knowledge, this study is the first to quantify the impact of a platform-initiated reviewer incentive 
program on reviewers’ regular ratings.  
Our results indicate that reviewers’ regular ratings significantly increase after they join the program 
and start to receive product samples. We also confirm the result with a series of robustness checks and 
falsification tests to rule out alternative explanations. In addition, reviewers’ regular ratings increase only 
after they receive a sufficient number of free products, and their regular ratings are positively associated 
with the number of free samples they receive. 
Our follow-up analyses reveal that reviewers’ regular-rating increase is mainly due to an 
uncertainty-reduction effect instead of a reciprocity effect. In other words, the observed regular-rating 
increase is driven by improved assessment and knowledge about products sharing attributes with the 
sampled products. Specifically, we find that (i) reviewers’ regular ratings increase only in the categories 
where the product samples are available, (ii) reviewers’ regular rating increases are more pronounced in 
product categories where products are less differentiated (or more homogenous) such that they are more 
conducive to product assessment in the same category, and (iii) reviewers’ regular ratings in one category 
are positively associated with the number of product samples they receive from the same category, but not 
with the number of samples from other categories.  
This study contributes to the extant literature in several fields. First, our study contributes to the 
research stream on regular rating generation where prior work focuses on the effect of seller-initiated 
incentives on the incentivized ratings (e.g., Cabral and Li 2015, Lin et al. 2019). Our results suggest that 
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the platform-initiated free samples drive increased regular ratings by extending the reviewers’ knowledge 
and experiences about products sharing similar features as sampled products. 
Second, this study improves our understanding of marketing strategies to accelerate product word-
of-mouth (WOM) (e.g., Cabral and Li 2015, Lin et al. 2019). Financial incentives, such as monetary rewards 
(Burtch et al. 2017, Khern-am-nuai et al. 2018), free product samples (Lin et al. 2019), and cash rebates 
(Cabral and Li 2015) are widely used marketing strategies to facilitate review generation and consumer 
referrals (Jung et al. 2020). We contribute to this stream of literature by showing how a platform’s 
sponsorship of reviewers influences the recipients’ regular WOM behaviors for non-sponsored products.  
Lastly, our paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the relationship between free product 
sampling and consumers’ review generations. The existing literature focuses on either the impact of product 
sampling on the incentivized rating (Lin et al. 2019) or the sampled products (Lee and Tan 2013, Mo and 
Li 2018). This study, however, specifically investigates the effects of free product sampling on the sample 
recipients’ regular ratings of purchased products. Moreover, this study broadly extends our understanding 
of the reciprocity effect in the platform-reviewer relationship. The theory of reciprocity states that receiving 
benefits can place the recipients in an uncomfortable state of tension (“indebtedness” in Greenberg 1980). 
When opportunities to reciprocate are limited, people tend to find alternative ways to reduce this discomfort 
(Shumaker and Brownell 1984, p. 14). In our research context, after receiving free products from the 
platform, reviewers are not able to repay the platform with higher incentivized ratings because the platform-
initiated program publicly prohibits such behavior. In this context, reviewers are able to contribute to the 
platform via different activities, such as more purchases, higher effort on review generation, and review 
ratings. However, reciprocity is not found to affect reviewers’ regular ratings in this study.  
Our study has important managerial implications for e-commerce platforms and online review 
systems as online platforms attempt to stimulate user activities such as review ratings and comments via 
reviewer incentive programs. Our findings demonstrate that a platform-initiated reviewer incentive program 
not only encourages incentivized reviews but also elevates the recipients’ regular ratings for the purchased 
products. Platforms need to keep this unintended consequence in mind when they making policies for their 
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reviewer incentive programs, as many important aspects of the platform, such as product sales and sellers’ 
strategy, are closely associated with the product ratings (e.g., Duan et al. 2008). Moreover, our results speak 
to policymakers and consumers concerned that platforms’ incentive may bias reviewers’ evaluation. Our 
results reveal that the reviewer incentive program does not bias reviewers’ evaluation of products they 
purchased owing to reciprocity, rather, the observed regular-rating increase is due to an uncertainty-
reduction effect. 
Our study is subject to several limitations that warrant future research. First, we do not analyze 
other aspects of review-generation behaviors than reviewers’ regular ratings. Future research could 
investigate how reviewers’ review effort and review writing styles change after they join the program. 
Second, we do not investigate activities other than regular ratings by which reviewers can reciprocate the 
platform, such as purchasing more products or making greater efforts in review generation. Future studies 
could investigate such means by which reviewers can repay the platform. Finally, we uncover the 
uncertainty-reduction effect by examining the relationship between reviewers’ regular ratings in one 
product category and the availability of product samples from the same category as well as the level of 
improved product knowledge brought by the product samples. We use the product category information as 
a proxy to describe whether the sampled and purchased products share common attributes. Future researcher 
could also apply advanced text mining techniques onto product descriptions to capture how product samples 
help reviewers understand the purchased products. Despite these limitations, our analyses document an 
important consequence of a platform-initialized reviewer incentive program on the reviewers’ regular 
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Appendix A. Matching Strategies 
 
We perform matching using propensity score approaches. First, we identity a list of reviewer characteristics 
that affect a reviewer’s participation of the Vine program, and we find that consistent with Amazon’s official 
announcement, the factors representing one reviewer’s review experience are significantly related to the 
reviewer’s program participation: the overall helpfulness of his or her reviews, review experience in 
different product categories, and review volume. Table A.1 shows the variable description. Second, we 
predict the propensity score of a reviewer at the month when the program launched (i.e. August 2007) and 
match the participating reviewer with the non-participating reviewer of the similar propensity score. Finally, 
we compare the distribution of propensity scores and ensure the balance of all variables. Table A.2 shows 
that there is no significant difference between the two groups across most variables after matching. This 
indicates that our matching is successful. 
Table A.1 Variables Used to Match Reviewers 
Variable Category Variable Description Variables 
The reviewer’s general 
experience 
The log-transformed total 
number of months since the 
reviewer joins Amazon. 
Log (review tenure+1) 
The reviewer’s reviewed 
products 
The portion of the number of 
reviews from the specific 
category to the whole reviews 
generated by the reviewer since 
the reviewer joins Amazon. 
The portion of the number of 
reviews from category “Books,” 
“Movies & TV,” “CDs & 
Vinyl,” “Electronics,” “Home & 
Kitchen,” “Grocery & Gourmet 
Food,” and “Health & Personal 
Care” to the total number of 
reviews generated by reviewer 
The reviewer’s recent review 
intensity 
The reviewer’s monthly average 
reviews in the past five months 
The average number of reviews 
(Regular and Incentivized) in the 
past five months 
The average number of regular 
reviews in the past five months 
The reviewer’s review quality The average helpfulness ratio of 
the reviews produced by the 
reviewer since the reviewer joins 
Amazon. 
Average helpfulness ratio 
The reviewer’s willingness to be 
contacted 
The binary variables to indicate 
whether the reviewer provides 
the contact or personal 
information. 
Three binary variables 
indicating whether reviewer 
disclose Contact, Description, 





Table A.2 T-test of the Variables Before and After Matching 
Variable Sample Mean T-test 
  Treated Control t p > |t| 
Log (review tenure+1) Unmatched 3.908 3.659 10.83 0.000 
Matched 3.908 3.943 -1.59 0.111 
Category: Books  Unmatched 0.309 0.281 2.76 0.006 
 Matched 0.309 0.326 -1.65 0.098 
Category: Electronics Unmatched 0.079 0.097 -2.87 0.004 
 Matched 0.079 0.067 2.19 0.028 
Category: Health & Personal Care Unmatched 0.008 0.011 -1.72 0.086 
 Matched 0.008 0.005 2.55 0.011 
Category: CDs Unmatched 0.082 0.113 -4.32 0.000 
 Matched 0.082 0.076 1.09 0.274 
Category: Movies & TV Unmatched 0.114 0.107 1.02 0.309 
 Matched 0.114 0.118 -0.74 0.459 
Category: Home & Kitchen Unmatched 0.068 0.062 1.05 0.292 
 Matched 0.068 0.067 0.18 0.858 
Category: Grocery & Gourmet Food Unmatched 0.007 0.002 4.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.007 0.006 0.63 0.531 
Average Number of Reviews (Regular 
and Incentivized) in the Past 5 Months 
Unmatched 2.607 1.475 5.31 0.000 
Matched 2.607 2.364 1.04 0.300 
Average Number of Regular Reviews 
in the Past 5 Months 
Unmatched 0.653 0.382 6.33 0.000 
Matched 0.653 0.677 -0.44 0.658 
Average Helpfulness Ratio Unmatched 0.844 0.828 3.68 0.000 
 Matched 0.844 0.838 1.67 0.096 
Contact Information  Unmatched 0.280 0.125 11.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.280 0.246 2.24 0.025 
Description information Unmatched 0.565 0.352 12.79 0.000 
 Matched 0.565 0.576 -0.63 0.529 
Location information Unmatched 0.900 0.878 1.98 0.048 
 Matched 0.900 0.908 -0.88 0.377 
 
 
 
